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Abstract— It is usually assumed that Honeynets are hard
to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be
unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption
and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be
completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial
logging taking place.
I. Introduction
At the Laboratory for Dependable Distributed Systems
at RWTH Aachen University, Germany, we run a Linux
based honeynet for gathering information on security inci-
dents. The scientific method dictates that we must attack
our own assumptions vigorously to get meaningful results.
Under the code name “NoSEBrEaK” we attacked our orig-
inal assumptions about undetectability and monitorability
of honeynets by turning the table and taking the view of
an attacker trying to control a honeypot. In the following
paper we present the results of this red team approach.
Honeynet researchers want to “learn the tools, tactics,
and motives of the blackhat community and share the
lessons learned”[1]. Therefore honeynets must provide a
way to capture the activities of an intruder in order to pro-
vide some information about his actions and the tools he
used. The traditional method used to capture keystrokes
and other activities on Unix Systems is to patch /bin/sh –
the standard interpreter – in order to log every keystroke of
an intruder to a special file. Other possibilities are to redi-
rect the output of syslogd to another host on the network
or to record and analyze all network traffic with tcpdump
and other tools. But network monitoring attempts are
doomed to fail if the intruder utilizes encryption – for ex-
ample by using SSH or SSL to connect to the honeynet
– to protect his communication channel. Then all cap-
tured data is useless because the information can not be
decrypted without the appropriate key.
Trojaned binaries on the honeynet that record all
keystrokes by the attacker can be circumvented if the at-
tacker installs his own binaries, which is a common way
nowadays. Thus, a new way to capture the activities of
an intruder on an Linux system was developed: A kernel-
based rootkit called Sebek [2] is able to record all data
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accessed by users via the read() system call on the hon-
eynet. It replaces the normal read() system call with a
new entry in the system call table pointing to its own ver-
sion of this system call. It is then able to record all data
accessed via read() [3]. Because Sebek lives entirely in
kernel-space and has access to all data read, this rootkit is
able to access most communication unencrypted and it can
for example log SSH-sessions, recover files copied with SCP
and record all passwords used by intruders. The recorded
data is sent via UDP to the Sebek server, the other part
of Sebek’s client/server architecture. This transmission is
done by modifying the kernel in order to hide these packets
such that an intruder can not see them. In addition, all net-
work counters and data structures have to be readapted in
order to make detecting these changes more difficult. Fur-
ther information about Sebek and its architecture can be
found in [3].
In this paper we show that a qualified attacker – in con-
trast to an unsophisticated attacker or autonomous mal-
ware like worms – has several ways to detect and circum-
vent Sebek, the primary data capture tool used by hon-
eynet researchers to capture the attackers’ activities on a
honeynet.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section II gives an
overview of related work in the field of detection of hon-
eynets. Several ways to detect, disable and bypass Sebek,
mainly implemented in our proof of concept toolkit Kebes,
are presented in section III. Directions of further work are
outlined in section IV and we conclude this paper with
section V.
II. Related work
Unfortunately, there is little scientific literature on the
topic of honeynets and none on detecting or circumvent-
ing data capture mechanisms in honeynets. The only re-
lated work was published in two fake issues of Phrack [4],
a Hacker magazine that is famous for its articles in the
blackhat community.
In Phrack 62 [5] an article entitled “Local Honeypot
Identification” was published. It describes a method to
disable Sebek by just overwriting Sebek’s read() system
call in the system call table with the original value and
thus disabling Sebek. We could not verify that this is eas-
ily achievable since it seems that the position of the original
system call can not easily obtained. Other techniques to
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detect the existence of Sebek on a host were also presented
in the article. They include detection of an outgoing con-
nection limit used on most honeynets and the existence of
snort inline [6], an intrusion prevention systems that mod-
ifies packets that look harmful.
Another idea to defeat Sebek was published in issue 63 of
the Phrack magazine [7]: The article “Advanced Honey Pot
Identification” describes a way to search through memory
and look for characteristic symbols used by Sebek. The
accompanying code is claimed to be able to reconstruct
several highly sensitive bits of Sebek data, including the
magic number and port numbers used by Sebek to identify
and hide its communication from others. After publica-
tion of the article, multiple changes in Sebek’s code were
released to counter this identification techniques, including
randomization of the symbol names used.
Issue 61 of the Phrack magazine contained an article
on detection of hidden kernel modules in its “Linenoise”
section [8]. The article describes a brute force method for
detecting hidden modules by looking for what appears to
be the key module structure. In our tests this method was
able to locate a hidden Sebek module.
There also is a tool named chkrootkit which “is a tool
to locally check for signs of a rootkit” [9]. While the doc-
umentation claims that the tool is able to detect Sebek,
this is only true for very old versions of Sebek. Detecting
is accomplished by searching /proc/ksyms for the string
“sebek”.
III. Several ways to detect and circumvent
Sebek
In this section we present several ideas and ways to de-
tect and circumvent Sebek in order to prevent logging of
user activities and thus effectively preventing honeynet re-
searches to collect information about intruders.
We first present ideas to detect Sebek, followed by sec-
tions dealing with disabling of Sebek and detection of the
honeywall. In the last section we describe several ideas and
ways to circumvent Sebek, in particular our implementa-
tion Kebes, a tool to effectively bypass Sebek.
A. Detecting Sebek
Sebek is a kernel module, so it leaves several traces of its
existence in memory. We now describe ways to track down
those traces, thus leading to the detection of Sebek.
One of our first experiments originally was aimed at mak-
ing logging by Sebek unreliable. By accident we found an
easy way to detect Sebek which can be used even by un-
privileged local users:
user@honey:~ dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null bs=1
This simple command results in backward running
packet and byte counters of the network interface, so even
an unprivileged user was able to detect Sebek by check-
ing the output of ifconfig. After we pointed this out to
Sebek’s maintainers, this issue was mitigated with version
2.1.7 of Sebek.
To understand why using dd should lead to unreliable
logging by Sebek, one has to take a closer look at the
logging process: As explained above, Sebek replaces the
normal sys read() call in the system call table with its
own version and is thus able to record all data accessed via
read(). The logging data is then transfered in a covert way
via UDP over the network[3]. Therefore, if we are reading
a single byte via a read(1), Sebek has to transfer nearly
100 Bytes of data including all the network headers over
the network to the host doing the logging. So if we are
able to do a read(1) some tens of thousands of times per
second, this will lead to a congested network and finally to
dropped packets. And we are able to identify a congested
network with the help of the ping command.
This leads to another way to detect Sebek, which we
call the dd-attack, since it can accomplished with a simple
command like dd, as shown above. To detect Sebek on a
host, we first ping a local IP-address (e.g. the gateway)
in order to get an overview of the current performance of
the network. Then dd is started in the background and we
rerun the ping command. If Sebek is installed on a host,
this leads to an enormous increase in the average round-trip
time. In practical tests of this attack the average round-trip
time grew from 0.7 milliseconds to over 4800 milliseconds.
But the fix in Sebek which was introduced in version
2.1.7 leads to a new way to detect Sebek: In an at-
tempt to control the backward moving transmit-counters,
the counters are untouched and Sebek modifies the out-
put routines for /proc/net/dev to deduct the number
of Sebek packages from the total number of transmitted
packages just before output. This enables us to com-
pare dev->get stats()->tx bytes with the values listed
in /proc/net/dev for every ethernet device on the system.
Differences can only be explained by the presence of Sebek.
Another way to detect Sebek is similar to the approach
published in Phrack 63 [7]: Sebek is a kernel module and it
has to use some kernel memory in order to be able to store
its variables like magic number and source or destination
port. Version 2.1.7 uses some randomization and other
stealth techniques in order to prevent easy ways to find
these variables, but Sebek leaves some traces in memory
that can be found:
• Since Sebek by default chooses a random number below
1000000000 as the module name it is easy to create heuris-
tics to detect the Sebek module purely by its name in the
lists of modules generated by the methods outlined in [8].
A small obstacle in doing so is that there are legitimate
modules with purely numeric names like 8390, a driver for
a generic Ethernet chipset.
• Helpful in the detection of Sebek symbols is the knowl-
edge that all it’s symbol names start with a letter, followed
by a number with up to three digits.
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• Also helpful is the fact that a conversion table to trans-
late IP addresses into integers is left in memory. In addition
to falsify /proc/net/dev output, Sebek has to keep more
than 200 bytes of strings in memory, which can be located
without great effort.
• The hidden Sebek module still has a complete module
header structure in memory. This structure can be found
with very little effort[8] and used to locate Sebek’s code
(e.g.its cleanup function) and variable storage.
• While the placement of variables in Sebek’s variable stor-
age block is different every time Sebek is compiled, it is still
possible to locate the variable storage block via the module
header. That information can be used to successfully guess
most variables like magic number, source and destination
port with a few tries.
All these traces can be found by traversing memory and
looking for appropriate structures and thus leading to a way
to detect hidden kernel modules, identify the Sebek kernel
module and extract secrets from the module. We are able
to implement this approach and it leads to another way by
which Sebek can be detected on a host.
In [5], a way to detect the changes in the system call table
for Solaris is proposed. We carried this idea forward and
implemented it: When Sebek installs its read() monitor-
ing function, it replaces the function pointer in the system
call table at NR read with a pointer to its own function,
declared in the module. While on a system without Se-
bek, the system call pointers are close to one another in
memory, this changes if Sebek is loaded into memory. The
address of Sebek’s function does not lie near the address of
sys write, the successor of sys read in the system call ta-
ble. Thus, if the addresses of sys read and sys write lie
far apart (e.g. more than 4096 byte), we conclude that the
system call table was modified by some rootkit. Further-
more, there is another similar way to detect Sebek: After
Sebek has replaced the function pointer in the system call
table, sys read points inside the memory range of a mod-
ule. This is a clear sign that the system calls were changed
and a rootkit is present. We wrote a program that searches
through memory and finds both of these anomalies.
As an example, Figure 1 shows the places of two system
calls in memory before and after Sebek is loaded. One
can clearly see that the system call table was modified and
something malicious is happening.
B. Disabling Sebek
After having shown several ways to detect Sebek, we now
point out sundry possibilities to disable it. One evident
possibility to disable Sebek is simply rebooting. Currently
Sebek offers no possibility to be loaded automatically on
system startup, but this can easily be achieved by cus-
tomizing the shell scripts. But integrating the installation
of Sebek into the boot process would result in leaving a lot
of evidence of Sebek’s existence and an avenue for removing
before: __NR_read = 0xc0132ecc
__NR_write = 0xc0132fc8
after: __NR_read = 0xc884e748
__NR_write = 0xc0132fc8
Fig. 1
Addresses of two system calls before and after Sebek is
loaded.
this boot scripts and rebooting to disable Sebek.
Another possibility is more complicated: Reconstruction
of the original system call table and thus effectively dis-
abling Sebek. We were not able to reproduce results from
[5]: Since sys read is not an exported kernel symbol, we
can not simply obtain the address of the original sys read.
It might be feasible to find the memory address of the origi-
nal sys read call through parsing the kernel image on disk.
An alternative would be searching through the memory of
the Sebek kernel module to obtain the address of the orig-
inal system call.
Probably the most elegant solution is asking Sebek to
remove itself. If we are able to obtain the address of Se-
bek’s cleanup() function we can call this function which
will result in Sebek restoring the original state of the sys-
tem call table and thus disabling further logging. Since we
have already shown that the key module structures can be
reconstructed, we are able to implement this approach to
disable Sebek.
C. Detecting the Honeywall
Most honeynet operators rightfully fear liability if intrud-
ers use the honeynet as a stepping stone to attack systems
of third parties. Therefore, two main techniques are de-
ployed to minimize the risk of a successful attack on third
parties’ systems: First, outgoing traffic is heavily restricted
to values like only 15 outgoing TCP connections per day.
Such extreme means of traffic shaping are trivial to detect:
We only have to initiate a large number of outgoing connec-
tions (SYN packets to other hosts) and watch if after some
number of connections we get blocked by the honeywall.
The second means of avoiding outbound attacks by hon-
eynets is the usage of a piece of software named snort inline
[6]. This software acts as an inline packet modification en-
gine rewriting what looks like something considered dan-
gerous to something harmless. The example for this tech-
nique used by the honeynet project all the time is the re-
placement of the string /bin/sh in shellcode with the string
/ben/sh[?]. Another example is the replacement of some
characteristic patterns in network traffic in order to render
attacks useless, as shown in Figure 2.
This allows us to detect a honeywall trivially by con-
structing some network communication containing strings
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alert ip $HONEYNET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
(msg:"SHELLCODE x86 stealth NOOP"; sid:651;
content:"|EB 02 EB 02 EB 02|";
replace:"|24 00 99 DE 6C 3E|";)
Fig. 2
Snort inline-rule to modify packets with x86-shellcode.
which match snort inline’s rewriting database and check
if the communication is received in unaltered form.
We are able to implement both ways to detect the hon-
eywall and our experiments show that a honewall can be
easily detected this way.
D. Circumventing Logging on a Honeynet
D.1 Overview
Logging on a honeynet can be circumvented by making
logged data unintelligible, making logging itself unreliable
or using ways not to be logged at all.
There is little we can do about the logging of all network
communications done by the honeywall. We might be able
to penetrate the honeywall and wipe data from the ma-
chine, but we cannot rely on this option. This means that
we have to use cryptography in network communications
whenever possible to avoid logging. The main problem in
doing so is how to deliver our initial exploit to the target
in an encrypted fashion. In many instances we will not
be able to deploy encryption when transmitting the ini-
tial exploit. Notable exceptions are exploits delivered via
HTTPS: If the target offers the HTTPS service we have a
wide range of opportunities to exploit the webserver, vul-
nerable CGI-Programs or other programs accessible via the
web interface while being able to communicate in encrypted
form and therefore unintelligible for network traffic logging.
To circumventing logging by Sebek we again take a look
at how Sebek obtains this data: Sebek has all data avail-
able which is gained by the sys read kernel function. The
PID and UID of the process calling read() is recorded,
as well the number of the filedescriptor being read, the
first 12 characters of the filename of the program calling
read() and the data being read itself. Nearly as interest-
ing as what is logged is the observation what is not logged.
For example, neither is the path of the file being accessed
logged nor the path of the program calling read(). This
means the adversary doing forensic analysis is restricted to
guesswork on what is read by whom. This allows us to clut-
ter up Sebek logging with arbitrary data. For example, we
can create a file looking like a legitimate shadow-password
file in /tmp and read it via cat. The adversary will prob-
ably at first glance assume we were able to read the real
shadow-file. We can also copy binaries, which we are going
to use, to random names and in doing so give the adver-
sary a hard time guessing which programs were executed.
While we have no direct control over the PID, we can add
frequent executions of fork() coupled with termination of
the parent to keep the PID being a moving target. If such
deceptive measures are executed in an automated yet well
planned fashion, we can mix the commands we issue to di-
rectly accomplish our objectives with thousands of dummy
commands. Hence, we can generate so much logging data
that forensic analysis will be made much more complicated.
Another option is to make logging by Sebek unreliable.
As shown in section III-A, this can be archived via the dd-
attack, in which dropping of Sebek packages should take
place. The percentage of packages dropped by the dd-
attack varies greatly. So while this method of circumvent-
ing is not fully reliable, it can be expected that the adver-
sary will not be able to fully reconstruct a session while a
dd-attack takes place.
The preferred method to circumvent logging is avoiding
it at all. In order to avoid recording of the activities on
a honeynet which is using Sebek, we have to avoid using
read() system calls, since all data which is read via read()
system calls is transfered over the network to a logging
host. One way of avoiding read() is to use mmap() to map
files directly into memory and therefore bypassing logging.
This allows us to read all regular files on the system without
Sebek noticing this at all. Unfortunately, device files and
files on special filesystems like /proc can not be read in
this manner.
For reading data from the network we can exchange the
read() system call for recv() which will not be logged by
Sebek. Unfortunately, this is of little practical value since
we have to assume that all network traffic is captured by
the adversary so we have to encrypt network traffic. So
while using recv() provides only limited help to keep data
secure at least it hides the fact from the adversary which
process is participating in the network communication.
It is notable that executing programs via exec() does
not involve read(). This basically means that we can in
theory execute arbitrary programs without logging by Se-
bek taking place. It turns out that this is only true to
a limited extent: At program startup, the dynamic linker
loads various dynamic libraries into memory. This is done
mostly via mmap() but also sometimes via read(). So if we
execute a program, there is a chance that Sebek is logging
a read()-call of a library by that program.
D.2 Kebes: A circumvention device
To experiment with some of the limitations in Sebek, we
constructed a proof-of-concept toolkit called Kebes. Kebes
is written in the high-level programming language Python
and is designed to allow a wide variety of actions being
taken on the target system without read() being called.
While Kebes uses a layered approach in communication
and is therefore not restricted in the type of communica-
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tion it uses, we opted for simplicity and decided to use a
traditional client/server setup: The server resides on the
target, listening on a TCP socket and forking childs for
handling connecting clients.
The TCP connection is used by a layer that we call the
crypt layer, which provides an AES-encrypted message-
based communication channel for Kebes. Besides the en-
cryption itself, the crypt layer provides some support ser-
vices like random padding and compression via zlib where
we use a random compression level between 0 and 9 to fur-
ther obfuscate the message length. The encryption is set up
by utilizing a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, so there are no
pre-shared secrets between the Kebes server and client. Us-
ing plain Diffie-Hellman makes the crypt layer vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks. But our concern construct-
ing Kebes was not to defeat the active attacker; such a
scheme must ultimately fail since the active attacker prob-
ably has also complete control of the target host we use to
run the Kebes server. Rather our goal was to make ex-post
analysis of network, filesystem and Sebek data hard if not
impossible.
Above the crypt layer we use the so called Kebes layer.
The Kebes layer consists of serialized Python data struc-
tures: Each command message consists of a list of com-
mands whereas each command consists of a tag considered
by the server as an opaque identifier of the instance of
command invocation designed to allow asynchronous re-
turn of replies. The second element is a string identifying
the command to be executed and the third element is a
list of parameters, which can consist of command specific
Python objects.
Tapping in the strengths of the highly dynamic Python
language, the Kebes server initially understands just a sin-
gle command: ADDCOMMAND. All further commands desired
by the client are dynamically loaded via the network in the
server process. This basically means that the server is only
a communication stub which is dynamically extended via
an encrypted network channel. This does not only make
maintenance much easier, since updates can be pushed by
the client into the server without restarting the server, but
also should make forensic analysis of Kebes’ inner work-
ings much harder: As long as no paging or core dump of
the Kebes process occurs, there should be no permanent
record of the more advanced functionality added to the
server by pushing the code for that functionality to the
client.
The Kebes commands implemented this way include be-
sides trivial to implement commands for listing directories,
getting file information, creating files and getting system
information some more complex commands: Deleting files
is implemented in the most secure manner possible in a
portable way in a high level language. We rename the file
to a random name, overwrite its content by a slightly longer
random pattern, sync the file to disk and repeat the whole
procedure various times before finally unlinking the file.
Reading a file is implemented by using mmap() to instruct
the virtual memory system to map the file contents into the
address space of the Kebes server. A copy of this memory
area is then simply sent over the network to the Kebes
clients. As shown above, this method of reading files is not
logged by Sebek.
Files are executed by first redirecting file descriptors for
stdout and stderr to write to files and creating a file
from which stdin will read. While using a file for stdin
creates a risk of being recovered – even if we try secure
deletion as outlined above – we see little additional risk
of compromising extra information, since data read by the
process we are executing can be logged by Sebek anyway.
Redirecting output to a file is the only way to allow us
using mmap() to read the output without calling read(),
although we gain this advantage by the increased risk that
secure deletion of this files is unsuccessful and forensic disk-
analysis will reveal the output saved in the files. After
the files are set up, the Sebek server forks, uses exec() to
execute the desired commands and after termination of the
child process returns process id, status, and output to the
Kebes client.
We also created an extended version of the execution
command which is able to receive a binary from the client,
saves it under an arbitrary name, executes it and finally
securely deletes the binary again. This version of the exe-
cution command can also create a temporary copy of an ex-
isting command on the target host with an arbitrary name,
executes the copy and then deletes it. While we have only
limited control on where the programs executed by us use
read(), we make analysis of data collected by Sebek much
harder by controlling the process names under which the
read activity is logged.
For highly sensitive code, which should fail under no cir-
cumstances in the hands of the adversary, we prototyped a
way to execute code without ever writing it to disk. To sup-
port this, the Kebes server can compile an extension mod-
ule based on C-Code for Python called shellcode-executer on
the fly. The shellcode-executer extension takes a Python
string – which can contain 0-bytes – and lets the proces-
sor directly jump into that string allowing the execution
of arbitrary machine code by Kebes. This idea could be
extended until Kebes could execute complete ELF binaries
received by the network as pioneered in [10].
The main challenge when implementing Kebes was to get
the entropy for the secret in the initial Diffie-Hellman key
exchange: Since /dev/random can not be read by mmap(),
we would have to resort to read(), which would allow an
adversary to gain knowledge of the entropy used to set up
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and thus reconstruct the
communication keys. We first contemplated to fork() an-
other process, which would perform an dd-attack by push-
ing as much data as possible through read(). This would
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be done by reading /dev/zero hoping that this would re-
sult in an overload of the network carrying the data cap-
tured by Sebek and thus result in not all data processed by
read() being logged. While it turned out that this gener-
ally works as expected, it is extremely unstealthy. We now
use clock jitter, thread races and the contents of some files
to get the entropy from.
We start two threads doing exactly the same: for every
file we find in the /var and /tmp filesystem of the host, we
add to a temporary list:
• A high resolution timestamp when processing started.
• The ID of the thread to encode the hard to predict fact
which thread is processing a file first.
• SHA-1 of the file in question if the file is readable and
smaller than one megabyte; if the file is readable but bigger,
the last megabyte of the file. Reading is done via mmap()
to avoid logging by Sebek.
• A high resolution timestamp when processing stopped.
Every item from this temporary list is then stirred to-
gether with it’s list position and another timestamp in the
1960 Bit entropy pool. While this method is probably un-
suitable for strong cryptography, it seems good enough to
seriously slow down forensic examination of network traffic.
D.3 Testing the NoSEBrEaK Ideas
To test the effectiveness in defeating Sebek by our
NoSEBrEaK ideas, we prepared a Linux-honeynet running
Sebek 2.1.7. This machine contains a CGI-Program which
we prepared to contain a stack-overflow. We also planted
a SUID-root executable with an stack-overflow in param-
eter processing. Instead of this vulnerabilities introduced
by ourselves, we could have exploited known vulnerabilities
in the Linux installation on the honeynet, but for testing
purposes we wanted to be somewhat independent of distri-
bution flavors and software versions.
We prepared an exploit for the CGI-Program utilizing
shellcode that is able to load a binary from the network
and execute it. As the binary to be transferred, we created
a compound binary consisting of the Python runtime en-
vironment the byte code compiled Kebes server. We also
created an exploit for the vulnerable SUID-root tool, which
is able to execute arbitrary programs with exec(). Finally,
we created a Python program packaged again as an com-
pound binary which accesses kernel internal data struc-
tures to find the Sebek module, guesses the values used
for network addresses, ports and magic value in the Se-
bek module and the addresses of the module’s init() and
cleanup() functions. This program is accompanied by a
minimal kernel-module which just enables the user to jump
to arbitrarily locations in the kernel. By calling this mod-
ule with the address of Sebek’s cleanup() function we can
force Sebek to disable itself.
Equipped with this toolset, we first connect via HTTPS
to the webserver on our target. Using HTTPS practically
renders logging of network traffic ineffective – although
analysis of traffic patterns and source address is still pos-
sible. We deliver the shellcode via a stack-overflow in the
path and the compound binary in the request body. The bi-
nary is read by the shellcode, written to disk and executed.
This starts the Kebes server which binds to a TCP ports
and listens to incoming connections while running under
user ID www-data, like the webserver it was spawned off
is doing. We connect with our Kebes client to the Kebes
server and add dynamically the needed commands to the
server. Then we write the binaries used to deactivate Se-
bek to disk and start the vulnerable SUID-root program
with parameters exploiting the vulnerability and starting
the Sebek detection and removal program as root. Finally,
we again exploit the SUID-root binary, this time to start a
Kebes server with root permissions.
After this few relatively easy steps we earned full control
over the honeynet machine while none of our activities were
logged by Sebek and the recording of network traffic only
left the adversary with some encrypted traffic and the clear-
text Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Therefore our experiment rebuts our original assumption
that even if an attacker manages to disable Sebek we would
at least gain a transcript of the methods used to disable
Sebek. We can not trust any data that is logged on a Sebek-
based honeynet if there has some encrypted communication
between the honeynet an a possible attacker taken place.
IV. Further work
There is a broad range of possibilities to enhance our
work in further attacking Sebek. But also several ap-
proaches in hardening Sebek against attacks come to mind.
For further attacking Sebek we see lots of possibilities.
Some of them include:
• Sebek leaves many traces in memory: It is a kernel mod-
ule and thus uses some special data structures, it uses char-
acteristic variables and builds UDP packets in memory.
Therefore it should be possible to search through mem-
ory and detect its existence in several other places than by
looking for module structures.
• Disable Sebek by patching the Sebek kernel module at
runtime to skip the call to the logging function.
• Burneye, an executable encryption program which is
suited to protect ELF binaries on the Intel x86 Linux oper-
ating system [11], is very popular among blackhats. With
the help of Sebek, the password used by an intruder to
decrypt the binary can easily be observed [3]. The imple-
mentation of a challenge-response technique for burneye
in order to protect the binary would make the decryption
much harder.
• Hook into the low level networking layer at the level of
the network drivers to unhide Sebek’s logging packages.
If we turn the table again and take the view of a honeynet
researcher, we see some topics of interest in order to harden
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Sebek and its general approach to log activities of intruders:
• Obviously, transforming Sebek to be a kernel patch in-
stead of a loadable kernel module should be aspired. De-
tecting and removing Sebek if it is not dynamically loaded
as a kernel module would be much more difficult and in-
stallation after a reboot would become a non-issue. On the
other hand, deployment of Sebek would get complicated
by doing so. In our opinion this is actually desirable, since
honeynets are dangerous and ethically problematic tools
and entities wishing to deploy honeypots should be willing
and able to got to the pains of patching and compiling a
kernel.
• Adding further cleaning of module structures in mem-
ory after installing the Sebek kernel module, using a less
predictable way of generating the “random” symbol and
module names.
• Further obfuscating the placement of Sebek’s variables
in memory and adding decoy variables.
• Deploying polymorphic techniques to further obfuscate
Sebek in memory.
• Using source and destination ports and MAC addressees
in addition to the magic number when identifying Sebek
packages to extend search space from 248 to 2160 Packets
when brute-forcing.
V. Conclusions
We have shown that Sebek can be detected, disabled
and it’s logging circumvented. This knowledge lets us take
a completely different view on data obtained by honeynets
and on data not obtained by honeynets. While unsophisti-
cated attackers might not be able to circumvent honeynets
or not even try to do so, we assume that sophisticated at-
tackers can detect honeynets and disable logging on them if
this fits their objectives. If there are already very advanced
techniques of detecting and disabling honeynets discussed
in the open wild [5], [7], we have to assume that there
are much more evolved techniques available to highly ad-
vanced attackers. This underlines our apprehension that
honeynet technology is only able to gather information of
the common crowd of unsophisticated attackers, but has a
very small probability of gathering significant information
on advanced attackers which would be of much more value
to researchers.
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